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Abstract 
The note proposes a novel decomposition of the Shorrocks mobility index by income 
components to identify the impact on farm income mobility of a marginal change in each 
component. An empirical application shows that a revenue-neutral change in the balance of 
agricultural protection between market-based support and direct payments would not have had 
the effect of reducing the variability of relative farm incomes in Scottish agriculture.  
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1. Introduction 
Income fluctuations are significantly larger at the farm than the sector level, leading to 
considerable movement of farms within the income distribution (Meuwissen et al., 2008). One 
consequence of this income mobility is that longer-term inequality is less severe than would be 
inferred from cross-sectional estimates based on annual data. For example, Allanson et al. 
(2017) reports a 5.7% fall in the Gini coefficient for Scotland if income values are calculated 
as two-year individual farm averages, with this fall increasing to 12% as the length of the 
measurement period is extended to include more years. A further corollary is that agricultural 
policies that reduce idiosyncratic income volatility should also reduce such ‘excess’ short-term 
inequality. Finger and El Benni (2014) identify this effect as an additional benefit of risk 
management schemes such as the Income Stabilisation Tool introduced by the European Union 
(EU) in the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform (European Commission, 2013).  
In this note, we investigate the broader conjecture that the historical shift from market-
based support towards direct payments in the CAP will have had a similar beneficial effect by 
insulating farmers from both price and production risk (Tangermann, 2011). Using the example 
of Scottish agriculture, the main contribution is to provide the first estimates, to our knowledge, 
of the possible impact of such a change in the agricultural policy mix on farm income mobility. 
For this purpose, we propose a novel decomposition of the Shorrocks (1978) mobility index by 
income components to identify the impact of a marginal change in each component on ‘excess’ 
short-term inequality.  
 
2. Methods 
Let ty  denote annual income in year t, with mean ty , cumulative density function (cdf) 
( ) ( )t t tR F y P y y= = ≤  and Gini coefficient ( )( , ) 2cov ,t t t t tG y R y R y= . The Shorrocks index 
measures the degree of equalisation if the measurement period is extended to T  years: 
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where ( , )A AG y R  is the Gini coefficient of average annual income over the T-year period 
A tty y T=∑ , with mean Ay  and relative ranks AR ; and the weights t t Aw y T y=  sum to one 
by construction. TM  will be close to zero if there is little income mobility and to one if annual 
inequality is largely due to transitory idiosyncratic income shocks such that ( , )A AG y R  is close 
to zero.  
 Further defining income as the sum of a set of components 1, ,( )ktx k K= … , which will 
be positive for revenues and negative for costs, then some manipulation yields:  
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where the first equality holds as ( , ) ( , ) 2 ( )( )A A t t t it A it iA At i tG y R w G y R y y R R NT y= − − −∑ ∑ ∑  
from results in Jones and López Nicolás (2004); ity , kitx , itR  and iAR  denote observations on 
farm 1, ,( )i Ni = … ; and kAx  is the T-year mean of kx . Hence TM  is equal to a weighted sum 
of component-related income mobility indices ( )1 ( , ) ( , )kT kA A kt kt ttM CI x R w CI x R= − ∑ , 
where ( , )kt tCI x R  and ( , )kA ACI x R  are the concentration indices of component k over the year 
t and T-year income distributions respectively, and kt kt kAw x T x= .  
 0kTM =  if there is no linear association between the component and income mobility 
since the numerator ( )( )kit kA it iAi t x x R R− −∑ ∑  in (2) will equal zero in this case.1 But, unlike 
TM , kTM  can be either positive or negative. In particular, kTM  is likely negative for a time-
invariant revenue component that is positively associated with income (i.e. similar to CAP 
direct payments) given that the cdf ( )t tR F y=  of the typically unimodal farm income 
distribution will be convex below the mode and concave above it. It follows from Jensen’s 
inequality that the average of the annual income ranks itR  of farms with low (high) average 
incomes will typically be above (below) their T-year income rank iAR , which in combination 
with the positive association between revenue and income will result in a negative value of 
( )( )kit kA it iAi t x x R R− −∑ ∑  and hence of kTM  (see Allanson et al. (2010) for further 
discussion). The weights kTν  equal the shares of the total covariation between year-specific 
incomes and ranks that are due to each component. These sum to one, since t ktky x=∑ , and 
will typically be positive for revenues and negative for costs. 
 To investigate how changes in particular components affect mobility, we follow the 
approach in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and consider a change in each farm’s income due to 
                                                          
1 Note that ( )it iAR R−  captures income mobility as defined by Shorrocks, i.e. the deviation 
between a farm’s rank in the period t and T-period distributions, with ( ) 0it iAti R R− =∑ ∑  by 
definition. 
a change in component k from kitx  to kitex  in all years, where e is close to 1. The effect on 
mobility will approximately equal: 
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where the derivation relies on the assumption that income ranks, and hence component-related 
mobility indices, will not be significantly affected by the change (see Yitzhaki and Schechtman, 
2013). Hence whether an equiproportional change in the k’th component increases or reduces 
mobility, and hence ‘excess’ short-term inequality, will depend on the signs of both 
( )kT TM M−  and kTv . ( ) 0kT T kTk M M v− =∑  since multiplying all components by e leaves 
mobility unchanged.  
3. Empirical application 
The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of farms from the Scottish Farm 
Accounts Survey (FAS) covering the production years 1995 to 2009.2 The FAS is an annual 
stratified sample survey of around 500 full-time farms, with farms chosen randomly to be 
representative of their economic size and type as enumerated in the June Agricultural Census 
(Scottish Government, 2012). Table 1 presents selected results as the measurement period is 
extended from the chosen base year of 1995, initially aggregating over the first 2 years for all 
farms present in both years, then the first 3 years and so on. Farms, once recruited, can stay in 
the survey for an unlimited length of time, with 172 of the 536 farms in the 1995 sample present 
                                                          
2 See Allanson et al. (2017) for a full account of the construction of the data set employed in 
the study. Limiting the entire analysis to a balanced panel led to lower values of TM  for small 
T, though the estimate of TM  for T = 15 is identical to that in Table 1 by construction. 
in all 15 waves. For each multi-year period, probability weights were re-calculated using 
Census farm numbers in the base year, thereby abstracting from the effects of structural 
change.3 All standard errors were generated using a bootstrap procedure that reflects the panel 
design. 
Farm income was defined as the difference between trading revenue and expenditure, 
with this measure of cash income representing the return to the group with an entrepreneurial 
interest in the farm for their manual and managerial labour and on their investment in the 
business (Scottish Government, 2012). Average annual income over the entire period was 
£34,260, with revenues of £117084 – £25960 in direct payments and £91124 in other ‘market-
based’ revenues (including associated grants and subsidies) – and expenditure of      –£82824.  
Income mobility was 0.054 for T=2, meaning that averaging incomes over 1995 and 
1996 reduced inequality by 5.4% compared to the weighted average of the Gini coefficients 
for the 2 years. Figure 1 shows that TM  tends to increase with T but approaches an upper 
limiting value of about 13% after about 10 years, with no further equalisation once relative 
incomes have approached their long-term values. Alternative base years produced broadly 
similar findings, with Figure 1 also displaying TM  values with 2000 and 2005 as base years, 
for which the maximum T values are 10 and 5 years respectively.  
The reported values of the component-related mobility indices imply that income 
mobility was not significantly associated with market-based revenues over any time horizon, 
but was negatively related to both direct payments and trading expenditure. As expected, the 
covariation shares are positive for the two revenue components and negative for expenditure. 
In combination, these results might be taken to imply that the ‘share’ of income mobility due 
to the association with trading expenditures was slightly greater than one, being partially offset 
                                                          
3 The results differ slightly from those reported in Allanson et al. (2017) due to this treatment 
of the weights. 
by the stabilising effect of direct payments and with market-based revenues playing no 
significant role.  
A more meaningful exercise for policy purposes is to examine the marginal effects. For 
T=2, an equiproportionate expansion in market-based revenue, direct payments or trading 
expenditure by an average absolute amount of £1000 per annum would have changed mobility 
by respectively –0.0010, –0.0011 and 0.0017 ceteris paribus. Hence, higher overall levels of 
support would have reduced mobility compared to what it would otherwise have been, unless 
offset by cost increases within agriculture. But a revenue-neutral change in the balance of 
support measures would have had very little effect on income mobility, with this also being the 
case for longer measurement periods. The elasticities of mobility with respect to the three 
components were –1.74%, –0.48% and 2.22% for T=2, with little change over alternative time 
horizons. The sensitivity of mobility to changes in market-based revenues and expenditure 
reflects the residual nature of farm income. 
 
4. Discussion 
Direct payments are generally held to have increased farm income stability in the EU 
(Tangermann, 2011), mainly because they are less variable than other income components 
(Severini et al., 2016). However it does not follow that direct payments will have also reduced 
income mobility, which measures the movement of farms within the income distribution and 
therefore reflects the degree of idiosyncratic rather than overall income variability. This note 
proposes a novel decomposition of the Shorrocks index by income components, with the results 
of the marginal analysis implying that a revenue-neutral change in the balance between market-
based support and direct payments would not have reduced the variability of relative incomes 
in Scottish agriculture. It also adds to the existing literature on the redistributive impact of 
agricultural support policy, which focuses on the effects on annual income inequality (Keeney, 
2000, Allanson 2008; Deppermann et al., 2014). In particular, higher overall levels of support 
would likely have reduced ‘excess’ short-term inequality due to farm income mobility. Further 
studies are required to explore whether these findings are more generally characteristic of the 
dynamic redistributive properties of the CAP throughout the EU. 
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Table 1.  Income mobility effects by income component with 1995 as base year.  
Measurement period 1995 only 
 1995-
1996 
 1995-
1999 
 1995-
2004 
 1995-
2009 
 
T 1  2  5  10  15  
Sample size: N 536  498  385  227  172  
Annual averages (£ per farm)           
Income 40789 *** 40744 *** 32533 *** 30686 *** 34260 *** 
1724  1525  1437  2227  2776  
Market-based revenues 89202 *** 87438 *** 79197 *** 76497 *** 91124 *** 
2813  2559  3521  8875  13097  
Direct payments 22230 *** 22615 *** 21596 *** 21971 *** 25960 *** 
675  640  758  1446  2093  
Trading expenditure –70944 *** –69309 *** –68260 *** –67783 *** –82824 *** 
2081  2300  3590  9095  12955  
           
Average annual Gini: ( , )t t tw G y R∑  0.505 *** 0.4677 *** 0.4982 *** 0.5072 *** 0.4815 *** 0.017  0.0147  0.0167  0.0326  0.0312  
T-Period Gini: ( , )A AG y R  0.505 *** 0.4427 *** 0.4622 *** 0.4530 *** 0.4200 *** 0.017  0.0144  0.0174  0.0337  0.0329  
Shorrocks Mobility Index: TM  0  0.0536 *** 0.0724 *** 0.1068 *** 0.1278 *** -  0.0175  0.0084  0.0142  0.0190  
Component-related income mobility: kTM            
Market based revenues  - 0.0008   –0.0040   –0.0029   –0.0383   
  0.0110  0.0176  0.0237  0.0454  
Direct payments  - –0.0358 * –0.0491 * –0.0662   –0.1103 ** 
  0.0213  0.0277  0.0459  0.0499  
Trading expenditure  - –0.0594 ** –0.0835 ** –0.1214 *** –0.2125 *** 
  0.0255  0.0333  0.0467  0.0600  
Share of total covariation: kTν            
Market based revenues  - 1.7637 *** 1.8344 *** 1.7939 *** 1.7775 *** 
  0.0861  0.1585  0.3783  0.4164  
Direct payments  - 0.2901 *** 0.2968 *** 0.2825 *** 0.3001 *** 
  0.0233  0.0364  0.0608  0.0683  
Trading expenditure  - –1.0538 *** –1.1312 *** –1.0765 ** –1.0775 ** 
  0.0996  0.1878  0.4279  0.4614  
Share of income mobility: /kT kT TM Mν            
Market based revenues  - 0.0260   –0.1025   –0.0487   –0.5335   
  0.3363  0.5040  0.6096  1.1056  
Direct payments  - –0.1939 ** –0.2013   –0.1751   –0.2590   
  0.0944  0.1416  0.1716  0.1859  
Trading expenditure  - 1.1679 *** 1.3038 ** 1.2238 * 1.7926   
  0.4078  0.6117  0.7405  1.2452  
Absolute marginal effect ×103:  /( )kT T kT kAM M xν−             
Market based revenues  - –0.0011 *** –0.0018 *** –0.0026 *** –0.0032 ** 
  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0015  
Direct payments  - –0.0011 *** –0.0017 *** –0.0022 *** –0.0028 ** 
  0.0004  0.0005  0.0008  0.0011  
Trading expenditure  - 0.0017 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0036 *** 0.0044 ** 
  0.0005  0.0008  0.0012  0.0018  
Relative marginal effect:  /( )kT T kT TM M Mν−             
Market based revenues  - –1.7377 *** –1.9369 *** –1.8426 ** –2.3110   
  0.3725  0.5911  0.9039  1.4937  
Direct payments  - –0.4840 *** –0.4982 *** –0.4576 ** –0.5591 ** 
  0.1000  0.1646  0.2070  0.2421  
Trading expenditure  - 2.2217 *** 2.4350 *** 2.3002 ** 2.8701 * 
  0.4450  0.7222  1.0598  1.6746  
Source: Authors’ calculations. Each statistic is based the sample of farms that are present in all years 
of the relevant period.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based on 1000 replications.  Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
